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Abstract—Adversarial examples are perturbed inputs that are
designed (from a deep learning network’s (DLN) parameter
gradients) to mislead the DLN during test time. Intuitively,
constraining the dimensionality of inputs or parameters of a
network reduces the ‘space’ in which adversarial examples exist.
Guided by this intuition, we demonstrate that discretization
greatly improves the robustness of DLNs against adversarial
attacks. Specifically, discretizing the input space (or allowed pixel
levels from 256 values or 8bit to 4 values or 2bit) extensively
improves the adversarial robustness of DLNs for a substan-
tial range of perturbations for minimal loss in test accuracy.
Furthermore, we find that Binary Neural Networks (BNNs)
and related variants are intrinsically more robust than their
full precision counterparts in adversarial scenarios. Combining
input discretization with BNNs furthers the robustness even
waiving the need for adversarial training for certain magnitude
of perturbation values. We evaluate the effect of discretization
on MNIST, CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and Imagenet datasets. Across
all datasets, we observe maximal adversarial resistance with 2bit
input discretization that incurs an adversarial accuracy loss of
just ∼ 1− 2% as compared to clean test accuracy.
Index Terms—Adversarial Robustness, Deep Learning, Quan-
tization Techniques, Binarized Neural Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep Learning Networks (DLNs) have exhibited better than
human performance in several vision-related tasks [1]. How-
ever, they have been recently shown to be vulnerable toward
adversarial attacks [2], [3], [4]: slight changes of input pixel
intensities that fool a DLN to misclassify an input with high
confidence (Fig. 1). What is more worrying is that such small
changes (that craft adversaries) are visually imperceptible to
humans, yet, mislead a DLN. This vulnerability severely limits
the potential safe-use and deployment of DLNs in real-world
scenarios. For instance, an attacker can fool a DLN deployed
on a self-driving car to mispredict a STOP sign as a GO signal,
and cause fatal accidents.
Subsequently, there have been several theories pertaining to
the adversarial susceptibility of DLNs [3]. The most common
one suggests that the presence of adversary is an outcome
of the excessive linearity of a DLN (a property of high-
dimensional dot-products). While one can argue that ReLU-
type activation imposes non-linearity in a model, the linear
operations such as Convolution, Pooling exceed the number
of non-linear ReLU operations. Further, ReLU is typically a
linear functionality in the > 0 regime, and hence, plagues
a DLN to be sufficiently linear. Now, this linearity causes a
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Fig. 1: An image of a ship perturbed with adversarial noise
yields an adversarial image that fools the classifier. The clas-
sifier predicts the original image correctly with a confidence of
92%, while gets fooled by the adversarial image mispredicting
it as plane with a high confidence of 91%.
model to extrapolate its behavior for points in the hyper-space
(of data and model parameters) that lie outside the training/test
data manifold. Adversarial inputs, essentially, are images that
are synthesized such that they ‘lie far’ from the typical data
manifold and hence get misclassified.
Fig. 2 (a) demonstrates this data manifold intuition and
adversarial input creation with a cartoon. Since DLNs are
discriminative models, they partition a very high-dimensional
input space into different classes by learning appropriate deci-
sion boundaries. The class-specific decision boundaries simply
divide the space into hyper-volumes. Interestingly, these hyper-
volumes encompass the training data examples as well as large
areas of unpopulated space that is arbitrary and untrained.
This extrapolation of decision boundary beyond the training
data space is a result of ‘linearity’, that in turn, gives rise to
generalization ability. The fact that a model trained only on
training data is able to predict well on unseen test data (termed
as, generalization) is a favorable outcome of this extrapolation
property. Unfortunately, this property also exposes a model
to adversarial attacks. Adversarial data are created by simply
adding small perturbations to an input data point, that shifts
it from its manifold (or hyper-volume) to a different hyper-
volume (that the model has not been trained upon and shows
extrapolated behavior), causing misclassification.
From the above intuition, one can deduce that adding
regularization features to a DLN’s training will improve its
generalization ability and in turn, adversarial robustness. In
fact, the most effective form of adversarial defense so far is
training a model with adversarial data augmentation (called
adversarial training) [5]. It is evident that explicit training
on adversarial data will increase the model’s capability to
generalize and hence predict correctly on unseen adversarial
data. However, the above discussion on excessive linearity
and hyper-space dimensionality points to an alternate and
unexplored regularization possibility, that is discretizing or
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2Fig. 2: Cartoon of the intuition behind adversary creation and
discretization. (a) The data points (shown as ’dots’) encompass
the data manifold in the high-dimensional subspace. The clas-
sifier is trained to separate the data into different categories
or hyper-volumes based on which the decision boundary is
formed. Note, the decision boundary is a characteristic of
the trained parameters (weights) of the model. The decision
boundary is, however, extrapolated to vast regions of the high-
dimensional subspace that are unpopulated and untrained
because of linear model behavior. Adversaries are created
by perturbing the data points into these empty regions or
hyper-volumes and are thus misclassified (orange mispredicted
as green in this case). (b) Discretization quantizes the data
manifold thereby introducing a minimum perturbation required
to shift a data point. As quantization will increase, so will the
minimum allowed distortion. Further, discretization constrains
the creation of adversaries since not all transitions can cause
a data point to shift between hyper-volumes.
constraining the data manifold for achieving adversarial ro-
bustness. For instance, discretizing the input data (say from
256-pixel value levels (or 8-bit) to 4 levels (or 2-bit)) reduces
the regions into which data can be perturbed. In other words,
the minimum perturbation required to shift a particular data
point from one hyper-volume to another will increase in a
discretized space (Fig. 2 (b)). This in turn will intrinsically
improve the resistance of a DLN. Similarly, discretizing the
parameter space (as in binarized neural networks (BNNs) [6])
will introduce discontinuities and quantization in the manifold
(that is non-linear by nature). This will further decrease the
extent of hyper-volume space that is arbitrary/untrained and
thus reduce adversarial susceptibility (Fig. 2(b)). It is evident
that such discretization methods have an added advantage of
computational efficiency. In fact, low-precision neural net-
works (BNNs and related XNOR-Nets [7]) were introduced
with a key motif of obtaining reduced memory and power-
consumption for hardware deployment of DLNs.
In this paper, we demonstrate that discretization, besides
offering obvious efficiency improvements, has far-reaching im-
plication on a model’s adversarial resistance. We particularly
emphasize on three different discretization themes and illus-
trate their suitability toward improving a DLN’s adversarial
robustness, as follows:
• Discretization of input space: We reduce the input di-
mensionality by quantizing the RGB pixel intensities into
a variable range: 28 = 256 to 22 = 4. We show that
for minimal loss in accuracy, the adversarial robustness
of a model substantially improves (< 1% accuracy
difference between clean test and adversarial test data),
even, without any adversarial training. Furthermore, we
show that combining adversarial training with 2-bit input
discretization makes a model substantially more robust
(than adversarial training with full 8-bit input precision)
for large perturbation ranges.
• Discretization of parameter space: We show that models
trained with low-precision weights and activations, such
as BNNs, are intrinsically more robust to adversarial
perturbations than full precision networks. Furthermore,
we find that training BNNs with adversarial data aug-
mentation is difficult. However, increasing the capacity of
the BNN (with more neurons and weights) minimizes the
adversarial training difficulty. For sufficient model capac-
ity, adversarially trained BNNs yield higher adversarial
robustness than their full-precision counterpart.
• Discretization of both input & parameter space: We
demonstrate that combining input discretization with bi-
narized weight /activation training greatly improves a
model’s robustness. In fact, training a BNN with input
discretization (say, 2-bit input) yields similar or better
adversarial accuracy as that of an adversarially trained
full-precision model. Thus, the combined discretization
scheme can be seen as an efficient alternative to achieving
adversarial robustness without the expensive data aug-
mentation procedure.
II. RELATED WORK
Based on the intuition demonstrated in Fig. 2, robustness
of DLNs can be attributed to two factors: property of the
input and model property. Consequently, there have been many
recent proposals [8], [9], [10], [11] that exploit the input-
dependent factor and try to remove adversarial perturbations
by applying input preprocessing or transformations. Due to
the simplicity of this approach, these methods are attractive
for practical implementations as they do not incur large com-
putational overhead (as with adversarial training) and do not
interfere with the learning process. Our paper complements the
results of the prior works while presenting a novel result on the
effectiveness of combined parameter and input discretization
for adversarial robustness.
One of the first works on input discretization by Xu et al.
[11] propose a depth-color-squeezing technique wherein they
reduce the degrees of freedom available to an adversary by ‘re-
moving’ unnecessary features. Our pixel discretization scheme
is based on their color depth reduction technique. However,
the key idea in [11] is to compare the model’s prediction on
the original input with its prediction on the squeezed input
during testing. Xu et al. train the model with regular inputs and
during inference use pixel discretization to detect adversarial
inputs. That is, if the original and squeezed inputs produce
predictions with large difference (greater than an user-defined
threshold), the model deems the input to be adversarial and
rejects it. Ultimately, the model outputs prediction for only
legitimate or non-adversarial inputs. In contrast, the key novel
aspect of our work is to train a model with discretized pixel
data such that the model looks at a reduced input subspace
during training that decreases or constrains its’ ability to
3overly genralize in the high-dimensional subspace. Similarly,
the thermometer encoding technique and input transformation
technique proposed in [9], [8] are guided by the same intuition
of reducing adversarial subspace dimensions. Guo et al. [8]
trained the network with images transformed in various ways
and observed improved adversarial resistance. However, they
measured robustness for controlled graybox attack settings
(where, the model parameters are known to the attacker but
the input transformations are unknown). Our paper’s results
on whitebox attack is a stronger notion of robustness as we
assume all parameters as well as input discretization known
to the attacker. Thus, our results while supporting the claims
of [8] are more substantial and generalizable. In Buckman et
al. [9], the authors propose a thermometer encoding technique
to map input pixels to a binary vector in order to make more
meaningful change during pixel discretization without losing
any information from the original image. While, the authors
show good adversarial robustness results on small tasks, such
as, MNIST [12], they are shown to achieve poor performance
on more complex datasets (like, CIFAR10 [13]) [10].
In order to address the limitation of the prior works solely
based on input space modifications, we investigate the effect of
combining model discretization with the input transformation
property thereby leveraging both criteria that contribute to
adversarial dimensions. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to formally evaluate and analyze the impact of input
and parameter space discretization for DLNs (across simple
and complex datasets including ImageNet2012 dataset) on
robustness. A recent work [14] demonstrated the effectiveness
of BNNs against adversarial attacks and observed a similar
difficulty in adversarial training with BNNs. However, they
did not consider input space discretization and its impact
on robustness. While complementing their results, we show
that quantizing the input pixels of a BNN during training
greatly improves its robustness, even waiving the need for the
expensive and time-consuming adversarial training, for certain
perturbation ranges.
III. BACKGROUND ON ADVERSARIAL
ATTACKS
Generating Adversaries : Adversarial examples are created
using a trained DLN’s parameters and gradients. As shown in
Fig. 1, the adversarial perturbation, ∆, is not just some random
noise, but carefully designed to bias the network’s prediction
on a given input towards a wrong class. Goodfellow et. al [3]
proposed a simple method called Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) to craft adversarial examples by linearizing a trained
model’s loss function (L, say cross-entropy) with respect to
the input (X):
Xadv = X + × sign(∇XL(θ,X, ytrue)) (1)
Here, ytrue is the true class label for the input X , θ denotes
the model parameters (weights, biases etc.) and  quantifies
the magnitude of distortion. The net perturbation added to the
input (∆ =  × sign(∇XL(θ,X, ytrue))) is, thus, regulated
by . Distorting the input image in the direction of steepest
gradient has the maximal effect on the loss function during
prediction. Intuitively, referring to Fig.2, this distortion shifts
the data point from the trained region or hyper-volume to an
arbitrary region thereby fooling the model.
Types of Attacks : In machine learning literature, there are
two kinds of attacks: Black-Box (BB), White-Box (WB) that
are used to study adversarial robustness [15]. WB adversaries
are created using the target model’s parameters, that is,
the attacker has full knowledge of a target model’s training
information. BB attacks refer to the case when the attacker
has no knowledge about the target model’s parameters. In this
case, adversaries are created using a different source model’s
parameters trained on the same classification task as the
target model. Since BB attacks are transferred onto the target
model, they are weaker than WB attacks. Security against WB
attacks is a stronger notion and robustness against WB attacks
guarantees robustness against BB for similar perturbation ()
range.
Adversarial Training : Adversarial training simply injects
adversarial examples into the training dataset of a model [5].
For each training sample in the dataset, an adversary is created
using FGSM [3]. There are several forms of adversarial train-
ing. For instance, instead of using the same  for all training
examples, [16], [15] propose to sample a unique  (from a
random normal distribution) for each training example. This
will increase the variation in the adversaries created thereby
increasing the robustness of a network to larger range of 
values. The authors in [17] use WB adversaries created, using
a multi-step variant of FGSM to guarantee a strong defense
against both BB and WB attacks. Note, the common theme
across all adversarial training methods is data augmentation.
In this work, we focus on adversarial attacks created using
FGSM and evaluate the robustness of models against WB ad-
versaries. We evaluate a model’s robustness/report adversarial
accuracy on the adversarial dataset created using the test data
for a given task.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We conduct a series of experiments for each discretization
theme, primarily using MNIST [12] (Fully Connected Net-
work, FCN) and CIFAR10 [13] (AlexNet [18] architecture),
detailing the advantages and limitation of each approach.
We compare the adversarial robustness of each discretization
approach with its’ full-precision counterpart (with and without
adversarial training), using  values reported in recent works
[15], [17]. For adversarial training, we employ Random-step
FGSM (R-FGSM) proposed in [15] to create a variety of
training set adversaries. R-FGSM perturbs the input X with
a small random step (sampled from a normal distribution N )
before adding the loss gradient to the input: Xadv = X ′ + ∆,
where X ′ = X+αsign(N (0, I), α = /2. We use WB adver-
sarial training to confer strong robustness toward all forms of
attacks. Note, for MNIST (CIFAR), we use  = 0.3 (8/255)
during adversarial training. For evaluating the robustness of
parameter space discretization, we use BNNs [6], [18] to
evaluate CIFAR10 and MNIST datasets. We also evaluate the
robustness of discretization methods on large-scale datasets,
CIFAR100 (ResNet20 architecture [19]) and Imagenet [20]
4Fig. 3: Sample images from CIFAR10 dataset for varying levels
of input pixel discretization: 2− bit, 3− bit, 4− bit, 8− bit
(AlexNet architecture) using XNOR networks [7], [21]. Please
note, for MNIST we use two different FCN architectures:
FCN1-4 hidden layer network with 6144 neurons each (784-
6144(×4)-10), FCN2-4 hidden layer network with 600 neurons
each (784-600(×4)-10). We imported github models [21],
[18] for implementing our experiments. We used the same
hyperparameters (such as weight decay value, learning rate
etc.) as used in [21], [18] to train our models. It is worth
mentioning that our paper is the only other work besides
[14] demonstrating the effectiveness of discretized/binarized
parameter space on adversarial attacks. While [14] conducted
experiments with various forms of attacks (primarily, on
MNIST), we restrict ourselves to the WB attack scenario and
extrapolate our analysis on larger datasets.
A. Discretization of Input Space
With input space discretization, we convert the raw integer
pixel intensities (0 ≤ I ≤ 255) that are typically 8-bit (or 8b)
values to a low precision range of δ bits (0 ≤ Iδ ≤ 2δ) as:
Iδ =
⌊
I
(256/2δ)
⌋
(
256
2δ
) +
1
2
(
256
2δ
) (2)
where bc denotes integer division. Such quantization reduces
the number of data points (given a grayscale input image of
size N × N ) in the manifold from 28N
2
to 2δN
2
. This can
be broadly interpreted as reducing the redundancy in the input
data. Fig. 3 illustrates sample CIFAR10 images discretized
to varying δ values. The corresponding accuracy (trained on
AlexNet for 20 epochs) is shown in Table I. There is a natural
tradeoff between input discretization and overall accuracy of
a network. Yet, the test accuracy loss from the full precision
8b to 3b is ∼ 2.2%. This verifies the presence of unnecessary
and redundant input dimensions that do not substantially con-
tribute to the classification task or accuracy. 2b discretization
decreases the accuracy by a larger margin (∼ 6%). Note, this
accuracy loss can be minimized by training the 2b inputs
for more epochs. However, for iso-comparison, we fix the
number of epochs across all experiments for a given dataset.
TABLE I: CIFAR10 Accuracy
Input-bit Accuracy
2b 82
3b 86.64
4b 87.1
8b 88.9
A remarkable outcome of
this discretization method is
the substantial improvement
in a model’s adversarial accu-
racy. Fig. 4 illustrates the evo-
lution of adversarial accuracy
of the CIFAR10 models (from
Table I) with increasing level of perturbation, . Note,  = 0
corresponds to clean test accuracy. It is clear that clamping the
input dimensionality to lower values increases the resistance
Fig. 4: Adversarial accuracy on test data for varying pertur-
bation values on (a) CIFAR10 (b) MNIST for different input
discretization
of the model to larger magnitude of distortion. We can thus
deduce that removing the redundant dimensions in the input
reduces the overall hyper-volume space thereby leaving ‘less’
space for shifting or adversarially perturbing a data point
(referring to Fig.2 intuition). 8b input model shows a decline
in accuracy even for a small value of  = 1/255. This further
confirms that presence of redundant input dimensions allow
even small perturbations to shift a data point. In contrast,
increasing discretization increases the minimum  that affects
a model’s accuracy catastrophically. What is surprising is that
for 2b input, a model’s adversarial accuracy (∼ 79%) for large
 = (8, 16)/255 is almost similar to that of clean accuracy
(∼ 82%). For larger  = 32/255, the accuracy of all models
declines to < 10%, except 2b. This is a very interesting result
since we have not employed any adversarial training, and still
achieve substantial adversarial resistance for a large  range.
Fig. 4(b) shows the adversarial accuracy results for MNIST
(trained on FCN2 for 10 epochs). We observe a similar trend of
increasing adversarial resistance with increasing discretization
for larger . Since MNIST is a simple dataset with predomi-
nantly black-background, input discretization (8b, 4b, 3b) does
not contribute much to adversarial resistance until we go to
extremely low 2b precision. In fact, 2b discretization yields
adversarial accuracy similar to the clean test accuracy (for
 = 0.1) exhibiting the effectiveness of this technique even
for simple datasets.
Next, we trained the 2b input discretized CIFAR10 and
MNIST models with adversarial training to observe the im-
provement in adversarial accuracy compared to 8b input adver-
sarial training (Table II). Comparing to the results in Fig. 4(a,
b), adversarial training substantially improves the robustness of
a model with full 8b input for larger  values. Input discretiza-
tion greatly furthers this robustness with > 10% accuracy
gain across different perturbation ranges in both MNIST and
CIFAR10. It is worth mentioning that the CIFAR10 accuracy
(79%) without adversarial training for  = (8, 16)/255 for
5TABLE II: Accuracy with adversarial training for varying
. Text in red are the  values for MNIST and correspond-
ing accuracy.
Data Model Clean :8/2550.1
:16/255
0.2
:32/255
0.3
CIFAR10 2b 83.1 82.7 82.7 43.98b 84.3 62.2 53.6 45.5
MNIST 2b 98.5 98.5 84.7 85.48b 98 84.8 74.5 65.9
2b input is as good as the accuracy (83%) with adversarial
training. This shows that input discretization is a good regu-
larization scheme that improves the generalization capability
of a network on adversarial data. Note, for  = 32/255 in
case of CIFAR10, the accuracy is similar for 8b, 2b since the
adversarial training was conducted with adversaries created
using  = 8/255. Including larger perturbation adversaries
during adversarial training will yield improved accuracy gain.
B. Discretization of Parameter Space
Since input discretization gave us such promising results, we
were naturally inclined toward analyzing a binarized neural
network’s (BNN) behavior against adversarial attacks. Here,
the weights and activations (or parameters) are discretized
to extremely low precision values {+1,−1} [6]. The dis-
cretization constraints are imposed on a BNN during training,
wherein, the parameters are clamped to {+1,−1} after every
backpropagation step. One can view this discretization as an
implicit form of regularization. In fact, it is this extreme form
of regularization that makes a BNN difficult to train (clean
test accuracy observed with BNNs is, typically, lower than
full-precision networks). As suggested in [14], the difficulty in
training a BNN translates to difficulty in attacking the BNN as
well. Referring to the data manifold intuition (Fig. 2), we can
deduce that constraining the parameter space during a model’s
training will introduce discontinuities and non-smoothness in
its decision boundary. Since adversaries are created using
gradients of a model (that is a property of the model’s decision
boundary), generating gradients (and hence adversaries) for
non-smooth functions will be difficult. This in turn will make
a BNN less susceptible to adversaries. Note, the input image
to a BNN is full 8b precision.
Fig.5(a) compares the adversarial accuracy obtained for
varying  values for CIFAR10 BNN (AlexNet architecture)
against a similar architecture full-precision network (with 32b
precision for weights and activations). We trained the networks
for 40 epochs since BNNs require more training iterations
to attain comparable accuracy as that of a full-precision
network. Here, we do not incorporate input discretization in
our analyses. All networks are fed 8b inputs. In Fig. 5(a),
for  ≤ 2/255, BNN shows better adversarial resistance (i.e.
adversarial accuracy is closer to clean accuracy). However,
the BNN’s accuracy declines steeply as we move toward
larger perturbation ranges. We note a similar trend for MNIST
(trained for 10 epochs on FCN2 architecture), wherein the
full-precision network yields improved robustness than the
BNN for  ≥ 0.2. These results contradict our intuition
Fig. 5: Adversarial accuracy on test data for varying pertur-
bation values on (a) CIFAR10 (b) MNIST for binarized and
full-precision (32b weights) models
that increased discretization of BNNs should result in lesser
adversarial susceptibility.
To understand this, we calculated the L1 norm of the first
hidden layer activation of the FCN2 network in response to
clean input images. We found that BNNs generally have a
larger variance and range of values than full-precision network.
Since BNN uses weight values (+/-1) which are typically
of greater magnitude than the small weight values of a full
precision network, we observe a larger range in the former
case. Interestingly, we find that the L1 norm of the BNN
activations (in response to adversarial images perturbed with
lower  values) approximately lie within the same range as
that of the clean input case. In contrast, L1 norm for higher
 adversaries have a much higher range. For a full-precision
network, the L1 norm range of the different  adversaries
and clean data typically intersect with each other owing to
the lower weight values (Fig. 6). We believe that the extreme
quantization of weight values in BNNs to higher magnitudes
causes adversarial susceptibility for larger range perturbations.
While the L1 norm analysis is not very substantial from a
mathematical standpoint, it hinted us to increase the capacity
(more neurons and weights) of the network. The motif here
is that increasing the capacity would increase the overall
range of activation values that might incorporate larger range
perturbations. Exploding the network capacity for MNIST
(FCN1 architecture) yielded a sizable improvement in adver-
sarial resistance with BNN as compared to its corresponding
full-precision counterpart (Fig. 5(b)). This is a crucial detail
of our analysis that: while BNNs are intrinsically robust to
adversaries (for small ), only models with sufficient capacity
can withstand against large  values.
Even with adversarial training, we observed the same trend
that binarized networks of insufficient capacity do not yield
as good adversarial robustness as that of a full-precision
network (Table III). For CIFAR10, full-precision network is
6Fig. 6: Normalized L1 norm of first hidden layer activations in
response to clean ( = 0) and adversarial inputs ( = 0.1, 0.3)
for binarized and full-precision MNIST model of different
architecture: FCN1, FCN2
TABLE III: Accuracy with adversarial training for varying
. Text in red are the  values for MNIST and correspond-
ing accuracy.
Data Model Clean :8/2550.1
:16/255
0.2
:32/255
0.3
CIFAR10 BNN 79.7 53.1 43.6 35.3Full 82.7 72.2 63.6 55.5
MNIST
(FCN1)
BNN 96.9 89.1 74.5 65.8
Full 98 84.8 71 61.7
the clear winner. While for MNIST (with excessive capac-
ity FCN1 architecture), BNN yields improved robustness. A
noteworthy observation here is that adversarial training sub-
stantially improves the robustness of a full-precision network
(see CIFAR10 results in Fig. 5(a) , Table III), while BNNs
do not benefit much from them. In fact, we find that BNNs
are difficult to train with adversarial training. The learning
rate/other hyperparameters need to be tuned carefully to ensure
that the BNN model converges to lower error values during
adversarial training. [14] also observed a similar trend and
explained that binarized weights are not as ‘malleable’ as full-
precision weights and hence cannot easily adjust to all possible
variations of adversarial data augmented to the training dataset.
We think that increasing the capacity of the network compen-
sates for the ‘non-malleability’ of the constrained parameters
to certain extent. As a result, we see improved accuracy for
MNIST in Table III with FCN1 architecture.
C. Discretization of Input and Parameter
Space
Next, we combined both discretization strategies and ana-
lyzed the adversarial robustness of BNNs with varying image-
level discretization. We compare the adversarial accuracy
of BNNs to that of a full-precision network for iso-input
discretization scenarios, as shown in Table IV for CIFAR10
(AlexNet architecture trained for 40 epochs). In Table IV,
BNN-2b (Full-2b) refers to a binarized (full-precision) model
with 2b input precision. Full precision models have 32b
precision weights and activations. While input discretization
for a full-precision network suffers a sizeable accuracy loss,
BNN’s accuracy fluctuation is marginal with a maximum of
1% change. This is expected since BNNs (owing to +/-1
binarized parameters) do not have as many dimensions (as
a full-precision network with 32b weights and activations) to
fit the extra information in the 8b input data. Thus, BNNs
fit 2b, 8b data likewise yielding similar generalization error.
As opposed to the results seen earlier with 8b inputs, BNNs
TABLE IV: Adversarial accuracy with CIFAR10 for vary-
ing  with different combinations of input and parameter
discretization.
Model Clean :8/255 :16/255 :32/255
BNN-2b 81 80 80 36.7
Full-2b 82 79.1 79.3 39.6
BNN-4b 81.9 58.3 52.3 36.8
Full-4b 81.1 53.8 45.1 37.3
BNN-8b 81.5 55.1 45.9 38.6
Full-8b 86.5 61.1 55.2 47.1
TABLE V: Adversarial accuracy with MNIST for varying
 with different combinations of input and parameter
discretization.
Model Clean :0.1 :0.2 :0.3
BNN-2b 96.4 96.4 60.7 62.3
Full-2b 97.8 97.4 35.4 35.3
BNN-4b 96.4 88.9 76.7 58.7
Full-4b 98.1 71.1 50.9 33.7
BNN-8b 97.1 89.4 56.1 33.6
Full-8b 98.2 75.9 38.5 26.4
with lower input precision (2b, 4b) have significantly higher
adversarial resistance than their full-precision counterparts
even for large  values. Model capacity does not restrict the
adversarial resistance in this case. This is an artefact of the
two-step quantization that increases the minimum allowable
perturbation to shift a data point. We can also draw an alter-
nate insight from this result: The constrained parameter space
of BNNs restricts their overall exploration of the data manifold
during training. Referring to Fig. 2 (b), this increases the
probability of untrained or arbitrary hyper-volumes (for BNNs)
thereby increasing their adversarial susceptibility. Increasing
the capacity enables a BNN to explore the manifold better
during training. By discretizing the input, we are restricting the
overall data manifold space. This allows a model, even, with
lower capacity to explore the manifold well thereby decreasing
the extent of arbitrary hyper-volumes. Table V illustrates the
accuracy results for MNIST (FCN1 architecture trained for 20
epochs).
We conducted adversarial training with 2b input discretized
BNNs to find out if it helps build adversarial robustness. The
results are shown in Table VI. Comparing to the 8b input
BNN adversarial training results in Table III, we observe a
substantial gain in adversarial accuracy. However, contrasting
the BNN results against Table II (2b input full-precision
networks), we observe similar performance gains. In fact,
the accuracy gains for 2b input CIFAR10 BNN with and
without adversarial training (TableIV/Table VI) are nearly the
same. Earlier, we saw that the accuracy (for low  values)
of a full-precision network working on 2b input data without
adversarial training is similar to that of an adversarially trained
network on 8b inputs (Table II, Fig. 4). Combining the adver-
sarial training results till now, we can deduce the following:
1) For low input-precision (2b) regime, adversarial training
does not compound the adversarial resistance of a network
(irrespective of binarized or full-precision parameters), for
lower  values. Adversarial training helps when the input
has higher (8b) precision. 2) Input discretization, in general,
offers very strong adversarial defense for lower  values.
Discretizing the input as well as the parameter space furthers
7TABLE VI: Accuracy with adversarial training for varying
. Text in red are the  values for MNIST and correspond-
ing accuracy.
Data Model Clean :8/2550.1
:16/255
0.2
:32/255
0.3
CIFAR10 BNN-2b 78.4 78.1 78.1 30.5
MNIST
(FCN1) BNN-2b 95.7 95.7 89.3 88.6
Fig. 7: Adversarial accuracy on test data for increasing
 values on binarized and full-precision (32b weights)
models trained on CIFAR100 with different input
discretization:8b, 4b, 2b
adversarial robustness. Adversarial training in a discretized
input and parameter space does not benefit much and hence
can be waived. However, in case of stronger multi-step attack
scenarios and to gain robustness against larger perturbations
(such as  = 32/255, 0.3 in CIFAR10, MNIST), the network
needs to be adversarial trained with corresponding large 
values.
D. Analysis on CIFAR100 and Imagenet
Scaling up the discretization analysis to larger datasets
yielded similar results as observed with CIFAR10, MNIST.
Fig. 7 demonstrates the adversarial accuracy evolution for
CIFAR100 (trained on ResNet20 architecture for 164 epochs)
for binarized XNOR (1b weights and activations) networks
and corresponding full-precision (32b weights and activations)
models. Note, XNOR networks are similar to BNNs (1-bit
weights/activations) with additional scaling factors to achieve
higher accuracy on complex datasets. It is evident that input
discretization is the most beneficial to obtain adversarial ro-
bustness. 2b input discretized models in both cases yield adver-
sarial accuracy close to the clean accuracy ( = 0) for a large
range of perturbations. The accuracy loss between clean and
 = 16/255 adversary for 2b-input XNOR (1.6%) is slightly
better than the 2b-input full-precision model (2.4%). This can
be attributed to the intrinsic robustness offered by discretizing
the parameter space of XNOR networks. Furthermore, the fact
Fig. 8: Top-5 Adversarial accuracy on test data for increasing
 values on binarized and full-precision (32b weights) models
trained on Imagenet with different input discretization:8b, 2b
that 8b-input XNOR yields higher adversarial accuracy for iso-
perturbation values than 8b-input full-precision model further
demonstrates the ability of binarized networks to counter
adversarial attacks. A noteworthy observation here is that the
loss in clean accuracy between 2b and 8b input discretized
full-precision network is small (∼ 2%) as compared to the
large 6% loss observed earlier with CIFAR10 (Table I). As we
scale up the complexity of the dataset, the redundancies in the
input dimensions increase. Discretizing the input for a complex
dataset thus eliminates more redundant dimensions that do not
contribute to the accuracy. In contrast, smaller datasets have
lesser redundant dimensions and are thus at a risk of suffering
a large accuracy drop with input discretization.
Fig. 8 shows the accuracy results for Imagenet (trained on
AlexNet). We only show the top-5 adversarial accuracy. We
see similar trends as CIFAR100. Note, the XNOR models are
trained for 50 epochs, while full-precision models are trained
for 90 epochs. As a result, we see lower baseline accuracy ( =
0) in the former case. Like CIFAR100, the loss in clean test
accuracy between 2b and 8b input discretization is minimal for
each model. Also, the accuracy difference between clean and
 = 16/255 adversarial data for 2b−XNOR (0.9%) is much
lower than 2b−full precision models (2.8%). This highlights
the intrinsic robustness capability of binarized networks even
for large-scale datasets.
V. CONCLUSION
Low-precision models or quantization techniques, so far,
have been explored to reduce the resource utilization of
DLNs for energy-efficient deployment on edge devices. We
have demonstrated that discretization also warrants security
against adversarial attacks, thereby, offering a key benefit of
robustness in hardware implementation. In summary, the main
findings/recommendations from this work are:
• Input discretization is major benefactor for adversarial ro-
bustness (with both binarized and full-precision) models.
2b input discretized models (without adversarial training)
yield similar adversarial accuracy as adversarially trained
8b input models for lower  values. Robustness against
higher  and multi-step attack requires adversarial train-
ing.
• Binarized (low-precision weights/activations) models are
intrinsically more (although, slight) robust than full-
precision (32b weights/activations) models. Adversarial
8training needs to be carefully done on sufficient capacity
binarized networks to attain similar adversarial robustness
as the full-precision models.
• Combining input and parameter discretization is an effi-
cient way of obtaining adversarial robustness to a mod-
erate range of perturbation values without conducting the
iterative adversarial training.
Our work unravels a simple idea that: hardware optimization
related techniques can potentially resolve or resist software
vulnerabilities (specifically, adversarial attacks). While we
focus on discretization, there is a lot of future scope to ex-
plore other efficiency-driven techniques (such as, stochasticity,
model pruning etc.) to gauge their implication on adversarial
robustness.
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